Note the part that states the priority of the evaluation: "The System Accuracy Shooter in the Loop factor and the Reliability and Service Life Factor are equally important, and are more important than the License Rights Ammunition, which is significantly more important than the License Rights Handgun and Accessories, which is significantly more important than the Other Characteristics Factor, which is significantly more important that the Price factor."
The MHS trials were designed to be carried out over two phases. The first phase was to weed out the majority of submissions. This did NOT involve shooters in the loop. Preliminary accuracy and reliability testing was conducted on computer operated equipment (sophistic Ransom Rest-type machines). Then phase two was supposed to commence with shooters in the loop (which, among other things, allows the military to test modularity as detailed in my post before this). The contract was instead awarded to SIG at the end of phase 1 after both SIG and Glock were the only survivors (both in position according to the rules to proceed to phase two a.k.a. PVT [production verification test]). This is why Glock had a problem with the outcome. Many many more rounds (tens of thousands more) were supposed to be fired with shooters IN THE LOOP to test all the parameters (accuracy, MRBS, MRBF, elemental testing, rough handling testing (dropping the pistols), ergonomics, etc.). Price was prioritized last over everything else in that quote, but it was settled first, because the real testing hadn't begun.
When the real testing commenced (just on the SIG), they uncovered its drop safety issue. When SIG came up with their alleged fix, the Department of Defense's one year follow up report stated they believed the "fix" caused triggers in XM17 pistols to "split". Interestingly enough, the double ejection problems and failure to lock back on the last round (more of an ergonomic concern) were experienced in the first phase of testing the XM18 (compact). None of these pistols could go 500 rounds without a stoppage. Unlike the full-size XM17 which required thousands of rounds (I believe 10k for phase 1), the XM18 was only required to fire 500 rounds each. Since Glock didn't have a compact version, they were required to submit extra pistols to match all the compact pistols tested by SIG. All their pistols functioned flawlessly.
Here's where it gets fishy. With the XM18 failing to fire 500 rounds from each pistol without a malfunction, that should have been the end of it, but as Glock's lawyers point out in their protest to the GAO, instead of disqualifying SIG and awarding Glock the MHS contract (after all, "the System Accuracy Shooter in the Loop factor and the Reliability and Service Life Factor are equally important" and the first priorities listed in the quote above"), they instead changed the rules midstream. The initial rules called for only 500 rounds for the compacts because the assumption is that reliability should be essentially the same as the full-size pistols and vice versa. When the XM18 failed, the army said 500 rounds per pistol was not a large enough sample to test the 2,000 round MRBS goal the pistols were expected to make (which Glock alone did). While it is possible that had each pistol had fired say 4,000 or more rounds, for example, the failures in the first 500 rounds could have averaged out. But every sample allegedly failed to go a full 500 rounds, so this tells me it is unlikely that SIG would have averaged 2,000 rounds for the remainder of testing (which was to occur in phase 2).
That would never happen in a "competition". Glock was eliminated after phase 1 (before shooters were even brought into the loop), and phase 2 only involved the SIG P320. It was during this phase that both the XM18 (compact) and the XM-17 failed to achieve their 2000-round MRBS goals as detailed in the DOD report. Specifically, the DOD said, "Both the XM17 and XM18 pistols experienced double‑ejections where an unspent ball round was ejected along with a spent round." This is in addition to 50% of the stoppages that were caused by the slide failing to lock back on the last round. Specifically, the DOD said "Slide stoppages accounted for 50 percent of XM17 stoppages, and 75 percent of the XM18 stoppages observed during IOT&E. In these stoppages, the slide failed to lock after users fired the last round in the magazine."
If people have trouble swallowing what I am saying, take it up with the army and the Department of Defense. Unlike other people who are just claiming what they heard, I am giving you the actual quotes from the RFP and DOD reports.
This all tracked with all the initial P320 videos on YouTube. I would say more than half of the dozens of videos I watched had at least one failure (stoppage) all those years ago before MHS. I remember thinking the P320 could not compete against the Glock because of this even back then. It's not that Glocks don't fail, I've choked one of my Glocks using bad ammo, but it's relatively rare (compared to SIG). Sure, you can see a Glock fail in a torture test like virtually every other gun, but how many videos do you remember seeing where a Glock just failed to cycle a round (compared to videos where it doesn't)?
I'm not bashing the P320. I'm sure it's a great gun now and they've worked hard to get the bugs worked out. Every pistol has them show up sooner or later (usually sooner), and it is certainly reliable enough on average for concealed carry. Heck, I will even go as far as to say the Glock—had it been permitted to go through phase 2 testing—would have also demonstrated failures due to the slide not locking on the last round as the newer thicker ambi slide stops cause malfunctions for me and at least a few others I've heard from (including Mr. Gunsngear), but that's different than having double ejections, drop safety issues, and splintering triggers. The DOD report also said that "During the PVT testing [phase 2], the MHS with ball ammunition demonstrated significantly more stoppages than with the special purpose munition." FMJ is the bulk of rounds used by the military.
This also brings up another misconception P320 apologists often raise. They say these failures don't mean anything because a pistol is not a soldier's primary weapon as if the army and DOD were only concerned with rifles. This is again patently false. This is what the DOD has to say about it:
"Military personnel conducting collateral activities use the MHS as their primary weapon system. Collateral activities include foreign and U.S. humanitarian assistance, counter‑terrorism, and counter-narcotics, all of which may involve military operations in urban terrain/operations, close quarters battle, and other operations on the battlefield."
It still doesn't matter. People will continue to make excuses for what happened and claim the P320 is the greatest pistol on the market today simply because they believed the military picked the best pistol. I've said it before and I'll say it again, I think the military already made it's mind up it was giving SIG the contract before MHS occurred, and it may have even been something worked out since the mid-1980's when the shoe was on the other foot. When Beretta "won" and the SIG P226 "lost", it wasn't too long before SEALs and others adopted the P226 anyway (and the P228). Similarly, it wasn't long after Glock's protest that the Secret Service, like the FBI, adopted the Glock 19.
Curiously enough, the DOD never resolved the MHS update in their annual reports. They started out recommending that the army investigate the reliability further. The next report basically said they were continuing it. The third report mentioned MHS but didn't update us on what was going on. The last DOD report, release in January of this year, didn't even mention MHS. Actually, it did, but they started using the acronym for something entirely different that had nothing to do with handguns. Then a few months later the ARMY awarded a contract to Glock for thousands of pistols including full-size, compact, and subcompact Glocks.
Are we connecting the dots yet?